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The Moral Significance of Indetectable Effects
Sven Ove Hansson*
Introduction
In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit I identified five "mistakes
in moral mathematics." The fifth consists in believing that
imperceptible effects are morally negligable:2
If some act has effects on other people that are
imperceptible, this act cannot be morally wrong because it
has these effects. An act cannot be wrong because of its
effects on other people, if none of these people could ever
notice any difference. Similarly, if some act would have
imperceptible effects on other people, these effects cannot
make this act what someone ought to do.
Parfit illustrated with collective actions in which effects of each
individual action are imperceptible, whereas combined effects are
clearly noticable and indeed highly significant morally: Each of his
thousand-headed army of Harmless Torturers contributes only an
imperceptible amount of pain to what they together inflict.3
Gruzalski 4 renamed the Fifth Mistake the "Criticism of
Individual Potency", and Klosko 5 focused on cases that "concern the
production of effects that are imperceptible not only because they are
not noticed, but because they must be performed in conjunction with
large numbers of similar actions before harm becomes perceptible." In
response, Parfit embraced collective consequences: 6 "Even if an act
harms no one, it may be wrong because it is one of a set of acts that
together harm other people."
Dr. Hansson is Associate Professor in Theoretical Philosophy at Uppsala
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1 Chapter 3 (1987 [1984]).
2 Id. at 75; see also Jonathan Glover, "It Makes No Difference Whether Or Not
I Do It, " 49 Proc. Aristotelian Soc'y, Supp.171 (1975).
3 Id. Cf his Comments, 96 Ethics 832, 846-7 (1986).
4 Bart Gruzalski, Parft's Impact on Utilitarianism, 96 Ethics 760, 778 (1986).
5 George Kiosko, Parft's Moral Arithmetic and the Obligation to Obey the Law,
20 Canadian J. Philosophy 191, 200 (1990).
6 Comments, supra note 4, at 847.
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Most discussants have also addressed the imperceptible effects of
sub-threshold pain inflictions. For example, Thnnsjb argued that the
Fifth Mistake is no mistake since pain intensity differences cannot be
imperceptible. 7
Kristin Shrader-Frechette has criticized Parfit for appealing to
"atypical cases" such as the Harmless Torturers, rather than to "the
typical cases of imperceptible effects", including "painless, subthreshold
exposures to dangerous chemicals." 8 She seems to be the first to see a
close relationship to the health effects of low-dose exposure to radiation
and chemicals, a major environmental policy issue.9
The more practically relevant category of examples that Shrader-
Frechette introduces are somewhat different from Parfit's original ones,
and indeed the label "imperceptible effects" seems less adequate.
Contrary to pain inflictions, low-dose environmental exposures are not
matters of perception but rather detection or discovery. Therefore, the
more general term "indetectable effects" is preferable to "imperceptible
effects". Further, Parfit's "mistake" should be replaced by the less
predisposed "problem".
This essay addresses the moral problem of indetectable effects of
human behaviour. It consists in determining if, and in that case how, it
makes a moral difference whether or not effects of human behaviour are
detectable. However, a couple of terminological clarifications should be
made.
First, "detection" of a phenomenon means that its existence is
ascertained through some empirical observation possible only when the
phenomenon exists. A phenomenon may be indetectable, despite
convincing theoretical reasons to believe that it exists. A nice example
was proposed to me by an anonymous referee: If we add a small
amount of hot water to a lake, the effect may be completely
indetectable ex post. Any difference in temperature that we can
measure is indistinguishable from random variations. But we know
7 Torbj6rn Tainnsj;5, The Morality of Collective Actions, 39 Philosophical Q. 221
(1989).
8 Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Parfit and Mistakes in Moral Mathematics, 98 Ethics
50, 57-58 (1987).
9 Id.; see also Shrader-Frechette, Parfit, Risk Assessment and Imperceptible
Effects, 2 Pub. Affairs Q. 75 (1988).
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from elementary physics that our action has increased the temperature
of the lake. This effect is knowable in spite of being indetectable.
Furthermore, the word "effects" in "indetectable effects of human
behaviour" refers to the effects of specified human actions or activities.
If a cancer develops in a person exposed to radiation from a technical
device, but it cannot be detected that the disease is an effect of the
exposure, then this disease is an indetectable effect of this exposure -
even if the cancer as such can all too easily be detected. It would be
more precise to speak of "phenomena whose property of being an effect
of certain human behaviour is indetectable", but the shorter phrase will
be used for reasons of convenience. 1
0
Although my examples refer to harmful effects, the problem applies
equally to beneficial effects. Relevant examples can be found in
preventive medicine. A campaign against smoking during pregnancy
will, if successful, lead to reduced infant mortality, but it may not be
possible to identify individual babies who survive due to the campaign.
Individual and Collective Detectability
Effects can be detectable either on the individual or only on the
collective level. The following hypothetical example can be used to
clarify the distinction. There are three substances A, B, and C, and
1000 persons exposed to each of them. Exposure to A gives rise to
hepatic angiosarcoma among 0.5% of the exposed. Among unexposed
individuals, the frequency of this disease is very close to 0. Therefore,
the individual victims can be identified. This effect is detectable on the
individual level.
Exposure to B causes a rise in the incidence of leukemia from 1.0 to
1.5%. Hence, the number of victims will be the same as for A, but
although we know that about 10 of the about 15 leukemia patients
would also have contracted the disease in the absence of exposure to the
substance, we cannot find out who these ten patients are. The victims
cannot be identified. On the other hand, the increased incidence is
clearly distinguishable from random variations (given the usual criteria
for statistical significance). Therefore, the effect of substance B is
detectable on the collective (statistical) but not on the individual level.
10 Parfit misses this distinction when dismissing, supra note 1, at 75-76, radiation
cases since the effects are perceptible although the causes may be unknown.
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Exposure to C leads to a rise in the incidence of lung cancer from
10.0 to 10.5%. Again, the number of additional cancer cases is the
same as for the other two substances. Just as in the previous case,
individual victims cannot be identified. In addition, since the difference
between 10.0 and 10.5% is indistinguishable from random variations,
the effects of this substance are indetectable even on the collective level.
We can therefore distinguish between effects that are completely
indetectable, like the effects of substance C, and effects that are only
individually indetectable, like those of substance B. It should be
emphasized that this is quite another distinction than the one that Parfit
makes between perceptible effects of a single individual action and
perceptible effects of a set of such actions in combination. Whereas
previous literature has focused on how "sub-threshold increments...
combine to produce discriminable harm." 11 the present essay discusses
the more general case of indetectable effects of (individual or collective)
actions that do not necessarily combine with the indetectable effects of
other similar actions to produce detectable effects.
The Nil and Reduction Theses
A distinction can be drawn between strong and weak versions of Parfit's
so-called mistake. The strong completely disregards indetectable
effects, assigning no weight to them in moral deliberations. The weaker
assigns to indetectable effects a lower weight than that assigned to
corresponding detectable effects. Hence, we can distinguish between a
nil and a reduction thesis for each of the two types of indetectability:
Nil thesis for individually indetectable effects (NI): If an
effect is individually indetectable, then it is morally
negligable.
Nil thesis for completely indetectable effects (NC): If an
effect is completely indetectable, then it is morally
negligable.
Reduction thesis for individually indetectable effects (RI):
If an effect is individually indetectable, then has a lower
moral weight than if it were individually detectable.
Reduction thesis for completely indetectable effects (RC):
If an effect is completely indetectable, then it has a lower
moral weight than if it were individually detectable.
11 Glover, supra note 2, at 176.
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Clearly, each nil thesis implies the corresponding reduction thesis.
Furthermore, complete indetectability implies individual
indetectability. We therefore have the following logical relationships




NI, the strongest of the four theses, requires full neglect of all effects
that cannot be demonstrated on the individual level. This is essentially
the standpoint referred to by Parfit as the Fifth Mistake.
Thesis RI, i.e. the assignment of reduced weight to individually
indetectable effects, is well-known under another designation: the
discrimination of statistical victims.12 Our societies are willing to pay
much higher sums of money to save known individuals in danger or
distress than to reduce mortality or morbidity by measures not
directed at identifiable individuals. Heart transplant candidates and
trapped miners are examples of the former, wheras most measures
undertaken in preventive medicine "only" save statistical lives, and
receive much less funding per saved life.
Thesis NC, i.e. the standpoint that completely indetectable effects
are no matter of concern, is a common implicit assumption in
environmental policies. On occasions it is also explicitly stated. One
example is a statement by Ernest Mastromatteo, who has served as
Chairman of the American Conference of Governmental Industrial
Hygienists (ACGIH), a private standard-setting body with a strong
influence on occupational exposure limits throughout the world.
Mastromatteo 13 conceded that the Threshold Limit Values issued by
the ACGIH "can never be used to guarantee absolute safety", but
found it sufficient that "they can be used to control adverse health
12 Alfred Weale, Statistical Lives and the Principle of Maximum Benefit, 5 J. Med.
Ethics 185 (1979); Leon E Trachtman, Why Tolerate the Statistical Victim?
Hastings Center Rep., Feb 1985, at 14.
13 Ernest Mastromatteo, On the Concept of Threshold, 42 Am. Ind. Hygiene
Assn. J. 763, 769 (1981).
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effects of all types below the point at which they cannot be
distinguished from their background occurence". A similar statement
can be found in one of the ACGIH's documenation volumes: 14
A TLV-TWA [threshold limit value - time weighted
averatge] exposure concentration of 5 ppm is
recommended. It is the judgment of the TLV Committee
that, if the average airborne exposure concentration to vinyl
chloride does not exceed 5 ppm, there should be no
detectable increase in the incidence of occupational cancers,
specifically angiosarcoma of the liver.
More recently, the Health Physics Society wrote in a position
statement: 15
[E]stimate of risk should be limited to individuals receiving
a dose of 5 rem in one year or a lifetime dose of 10 rem in
addition to natural background. Below these doses, risk
estimates should not be used; expressions of risk should only
be qualitative emphasizing the inability to detect any
increased health detriment (i.e., zero health effects is the
most likely outcome).
However, the NC thesis is far from uncontroversial. In most
countries, radiation protection is based on a presumed linear dose-effect
model; the same applies to genotoxic carcinogens. According to the
linear model, the expected number of excess cancer cases is
approximately proportionate to the dose, and in particular it is not zero
at above-zero doses. 16 When the linear model is combined with the
standard measure of risk, namely the statistically expected number
(expectation value) of fatalies, the outcome is a regulatory practice that
contradicts not only the NC but also the weaker RC thesis.
Moral Arguments
The following hypothetical can be used to clarify some implications
of the four theses under consideration.
14 Documentation of the threshold limit values and biological exposure indices,
1698-1699 (6th Ed. 1991) Am. Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists.
15 Radiation Risk in Perspective, position statement of the Health Physics Soc'y,
adopted Jan. 1996 <http://www.inel.gov/resources/research/tschaech.html> (visited
Aug. 25, 1999).
16 Sven Ove Hansson, Setting the Limit. Occupational Health Standards and the
Limits of Science, 115-119 (1998); see also Sven Ove Hansson, The Detection
Level, 22 Regul. Toxicol. & Pharmacol. 103 (1995).
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Three forms of lung cancer in the general population, are
called I, II, and III. These variants have, respectively,
frequencies of 9%, 1% and almost zero in the general
population. Each has the same clinical symptoms, treatment,
and prognosis. Differences, inconsequential for individual
patients, can only be detected through laboratory tests.
Substance D, previously used by a large plastics
manufacturer, gave rise to cancer variant III among 0.5% of
exposed workers. This effect of the substance is clearly
detectable on the individual level, and we can presume that
it is considered to be unacceptable.
The company came up with a replacement, E. It also
gives rise to lung cancer among 0.5% of the exposed, but
the cancer is variant II. As a consequence, the effect is
individually indetectable (but detectable collectively).
According to thesis RI, the situation was improved through
this replacement, and according to thesis NI the problem
had vanished, and there was nothing to worry about.
However, due to public opposition to the NI thesis, the
company continued research; after a while, it replaced E
with new substance F. Like its predecessors, F gives rise to
lung cancer among 0.5% of the exposed, but in this case,
variant I. Therefore, the effect is not detectable even on the
collective (statistical) level. According to thesis RC, the
situation has improved, and according to thesis RI the
problem is completely solved.
It's hard to believe that anybody would seriously claim that the
replacement of D by E, or of E by F, was an improvement. The
problem may be less conspicuous, but not less morally serious. The
example can thus be used as a counterexample against all four theses.
However, examples can also be found in which the reduction theses
have a certain plausibility:
In an acute situation there are two ways to repair a
serious leakage in a nuclear reactor. One is to send in a single
repairman, who will receive such a high radiactive dose that
he is sure to die from cancer within ten years. The other
option is to divide the dose between 100 persons. Each of
them will have a 1% increase in the risk of dying from
cancer during the coming ten years. Such an increase will
not be statistically distinguishable from background
variations.
The two options have the same expectation value, 1 excess death from
cancer. Yet, it is fairly safe to surmise that almost all of us (including
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risk managers and regulators) would prefer the second option to the
first. If so, we may be said to endorse thesis RC.
A more general argument in favor of thesis RI (from which RC
follows) can be based on the special duties owed to certain people. For
instance, my duty to my children is greater than my duties to my
neighbour's. Similarly, my duties towards the neighbour's children,
with whom I am acquainted, are stronger than those towards strangers.
A special weight emanates from such relationships.
This special weight is not necessarily zero for people towards whom
I have no relationship other than as fellow human being. It seems
natural to assume that it is still above zero for persons who have at least
been identified. In other words, from my point of view, trapped miners
stand in the same type of relationship to the statistical beneficiaries of
preventive medicine as my kin and friends to the trapped miners.
In many cases, the morally relevant special relations between
identified persons can be expressed as rights. Trapped miners may be
said to have a right to our assistance, whereas statistical victims are not
identifiable rights-holders and hence have no rights.
It must be emphasized that this is an argument for the RI thesis, but
not for any of the two Nil theses. The personal relationships that may
persist between identifiable persons give rise to increased moral concern
and perhaps to additional moral obligations, but their absence does not
create a moral vacuum.
In summary, the Nil theses (NI and NC) are implausible and can
be at least provisionally rejected. This conclusion corroborates Parfit's
choice of the term "mistake". With respect to the less extreme
Reduction theses (RI and RC), the picture is less clear. Examples can be
constructed that seem to support the two principles, but so can
examples that point in the opposite direction. A reasonable argument in
their favour can be based on the moral role of special personal
relationships, but this is not a compelling argument. A reasonable moral
theory may, but need not, support the two reduction theses.
